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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the role of the semantics of definite articles in the analysis
of e(xtended)NP-island effects. It brings in a new sort of evidence confirming the proposal
of [25] for German and [6] for English that the semantics of the so called “strong” articles
and demonstratives differs qualitatively from that of “weak” articles and the in that the
former involves a pronominal element which makes corresponding eNPs directly referential.
Islandhood for wh-subextraction thus emerges as a new diagnostic for direct referentiality.
1 Introduction
This paper provides a semantic-pragmatic analysis of the ban on wh-subextraction out of a
certain type of eNP. Austro-Bavarian German features two distinct definite articles which con-
trast with respect to the wh-subextraction ban. Namely, wh-subextraction is possible out of a
weak-eNP in (1), but leads to ungrammaticality in (2) (in any context).
(1) Vo
of
wem
whom
host
have
du
you
[s
detw
Possbldl
passport.photo
t]
t
gsegn?
seen
‘Who did you see the passport picture of?’
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Intended: ‘Who did you see that passport picture of?’ (adapted from [29])
The problem of the impossibility of establishing dependencies between a wh-word and a trace
embedded within certain king of eNPs has been around at least since [4]. In [7], [19], [22], [14]
the notions of specificity and definiteness has been proposed as relevant for the wh-subextraction
ban. To my knowledge, there has been no investigation as to what goes wrong on the semantic
side. I propose that the locus of the contrast between (1) and (2) is the interaction of the
semantics of a strong definite article with requirements pragmatically imposed on the set of
possible answers to the question. I demonstrate that subextraction out of strong-eNPs results
in questions which cannot serve to update the inquirer’s state of knowledge: both the asserted
and the presupposed contents of possible answers to such questions have to be part of the
inquirer’s knowledge prior to uttering the question. I propose that questions with what I call
zero information-seeking potential are ungrammatical, unlike rhetorical and biased questions,
which, although not updating the inquirer’s state of knowledge in some contexts, can serve
this purpose in others. This project aligns with a number of recents studies of constraints
on movement whereby such constraints are analyzed as stemming from semantic-pragmatic
constraints on question formation ([9], [24] and references therein), rather than from syntactic
factors. The analysis proposed in this paper can be extended onto a number of other languages
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which feature eNPs contrasting with respect to the wh-subextraction possibilities, in particular,
onto English, French, Italian, Komi, Russian, and Spanish where demonstrative-eNPs are wh-
subextraction islands. Islandhood with respect to wh-subextraction thus emerges as a new
diagnostic for direct referentiality.
In the next section I introduce the Autro-Bavarian strong and weak article paradigms fol-
lowed by the discussion of articles’ semantics based on the proposal of [25]. Then I will proceed
to the analysis of the interaction of articles’ semantics with the semantics of questions.
2 Weak and strong definite articles in Austro-Bavarian
Austro-Bavarian is among varieties of German that distinguish between two types of definite
articles, the “weak” and the “strong” series ([23], [29]). Throughout this paper I refer to nominal
expressions headed by strong and weak articles as strong-eNPs and weak-eNPs respectively.
According to the generalizations made in [25] for Standard German and [29] for Austro-
Bavarian, descriptively, a strong article is used in contexts where the eNP in question has an
anaphoric or deictic antecedent, as in (3). A weak article is used whenever it is part of the
common ground that the eNP has only one possible referent in a given situation, as in (4).
(A points to a house (the only one in the immediate surrounding) and asks B,)
(3) Gfoit
like
da
you
s’/#des
detw/dets
Haus?
house
‘Do you like this house?’
(4) Wie
how
geht
goes
’s
it
’n
prt
da/*dea
detw/dets
Frau?
woman
‘How is your wife doing?’ ([29, 7])
[25] essentially proposes a classic Fregean treatment for the weak article, supplemented with
a machinery of domain restrictions, which results in picking out a unique individual with a
relevant property within a relevant domain.1
(5) [[Dw]] = λP<e,t> : ∃!x[P(x)] . ιx[P(x)] (based on [25])
The strong article crucially, has an “enriched” LF compared to the weak one in that it includes
a silent individual pronoun (here it bears the index 1).
(6) [1 [Ds NP]] (based on [25])
The denotation of the strong article differs from (5) in that it involves an individual argument.
Namely, the function denoted by the strong article takes a property of individuals P, an indi-
vidual argument y, and, if defined, returns a unique individual with property P identical to the
argument individual y.
(7) [[Ds]] = λP<e,t> . λy : ∃!x[P(x) & x = y] . ιx[P(x) & x = y] (based on [25])
Notice that (7) can be rewritten equivalently as in (8).
(8) [[Ds]] = λP<e,t> . λy : P(y) . y
1[25] implements his analysis of German articles in the situation semantics framework of [18]. In order to
simplify the discussion I omit the situational aspect of Schwarz’s (2009) model (undeniably a crucial one for the
treatment of weak-eNPs).
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In the next section I examine the semantics of wh-subextraction out of a strong-eNP, showing
that the crucial property of a strong article is that it makes [[i Ds NP ]]g, if defined, to be
identical to a particular individual g(i).
3 Semantics of wh-subextraction out of strong-eNP
In this section I look in detail at how the semantics of articles interacts with the interpretation
of questions. I assume that the semantics of questions involves two main ingredients: the
semantics of the question word and the semantics of its complement (roughly, TP). I first
discuss the contribution of the strong article to the interpretation of the TP, and then show
why such a TP cannot be part of a grammatical question.
Given the LF in (6), a question with a strong-eNP has the following LF, assuming that as a
result of movement, the wh-phrase becomes a sister to TP, which results in lambda-abstraction
over TP.2
(9) who λ1 TP [you have seen [2 [des passport picture of t1]]]
Assuming (8), the denotation of the object eNP is as follows.
(10) [[2 des picture of t1]]g,w is defined iff g(2) is a passport picture of g(1) in w
if defined, [[2 des picture of t1]]g,w = g(2)
Assuming, as in [12], that presuppositions introduced by subconstituents become restrictions
on the domain of the function denoted by a larger expression, the presupposition introduced
by the strong-eNP that g(2) is a passport picture of g(1) turns into a restriction on the domain
of the function denoted by the whole TP, as shown below.
(11) λx . [[you have seen [2 des picture of t1]]]g[1→x],w =
= λx : in w, g(2) is a passport picture of x . the hearer has seen g(2) in w
As a denotation of TP, we obtain a function which, if defined, maps an individual to truth in
case the hearer has seen the picture g(2). Notice that relative to any given possible world this
is a constant function. In what follows I argue that a question has to be formed based on a
function with a variable output in a given world.
I assume a version of the semantics of questions of [16], whereby a wh-word such as what
or who denotes a function from open propositions (denotation of the complement of the wh-
word, our TP) to a function from worlds to sets of propositions. Each proposition in this set
corresponds to the function denoted by the complement of the wh-word with its argument slot
filled by some individual from the domain of the wh-word. The following is an adaptation of
Karttunen’s (1977) wh-semantics.3
(12) [[who]] = λf<s,<e,t>> . λw . {p: ∃x∈De[x is a person in w & p = λw′ . f(w′)(x)]}
2Both in English and in Austro-Bavarian I assume that the preposition vo(n)/of is semantically vacuous.
It therefore does not make a semantic difference whether the preposition is stranded, as in English, or carried
along with the wh-word, as in Austro-Bavarian. Also, here and throughout the paper, I use English words in
LF and semantic formulae for the clarity of exposition.
3In Karttunen’s (1977) original version the answer-set contained only true answers. In addition, the original
version involves formation of a proto-question, a singleton set containing an (open) proposition corresponding to
denotation of TP. The proto-question then serves as an argument to the wh-function. The original version was
designed to accommodate cases of multiple wh-words. Since I am not concerned with those here, a simplified
version in (12) is enough for the present purposes.
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Let us see how this works for the case at hand. Let us assume that the domain De in (2) is a set
of three individuals {Hans, Elsa, Otto}. Assuming that [[who]] combines with the denotation of
its complement by the intensional version of Function Application spelled out in [12, 308] and
given (11), we obtain the following extension of the question in a world w where there are three
individuals, Hans, Elsa, and Otto, in the domain of the wh-word.
(13) [[who]]g(λw. (11)) = {[λw′: in w′, g(2) is a passport picture of x . the hearer has seen
g(2) in w′]: x∈{Hans, Elsa, Otto}}
Answer-propositions in (13) differ only in the presupposition associated with each of them,
whereas their asserted content is identical. Intuitively, it seems that possible answers to a
question should differ precisely in what is not yet presupposed. We ended up with possible
answers of this sort because the individuals from the domain of the wh-word make no semantic
contribution to the asserted content of answer-propositions: whatever value is assigned to t1
when interpreting the object eNP, it ends up denoting the individual g(2), by (8).
The question is now what, given the general theory of questions, is wrong with a question all
possible answers to which are identical in what they assert? The following discussion consists of
two parts. First, I propose that the asserted content of the possible answers gets presupposed
by such a question. Second, I demonstrate that accommodation of the presupposed content of
the answers cannot be a source of new information either, because inquirers cannot introduce
presuppositions they are ignorant about.
3.1 Question’s “existential” presupposition
When asking the who-question in (2), the point of departure for the inquirer is that the hearer
has seen someone’s picture. Following up on similar intuitions, [13] and [16], among others,
assumed that questions carry something like an existential presupposition. A wh-question of the
form wh TP seems to presuppose ∃x[[[TP ]](x) = 1], that is, that there exists an individual which
has the property denoted by TP. While it was shown that the alleged existential presupposition
of an embedded question projects through negation and presuppositional holes, questions do
not pass all the presupposition tests in that they are defeasible, [10]. The same is true for
Austro-Bavarian. Instead of denying the presence of an existential presupposition in questions
altogether, negative answers to wh-questions have been taken to convey that the presupposition
is not met, as in [5], [20]. I follow [1] who proposed that such defeasible presuppositions are
generated every time we deal with a grammatical object whose semantics makes reference to a
set of alternatives. The presence of such a set in the semantic representation triggers a default
presupposition that a proposition corresponding to the disjunction of the propositions in the
alternative set is true. This creates the effect of an existential presupposition.4
Let us look from this perspective at (2). The requirement that there be a true answer is
satisfied in case (14) is true (existential closure of the presuppositions of possible answers; for
at least one answer to be true, the function denoted by at least one answer has to be defined)
and (15) is true.
(14) λw . ∃x∈{Hans, Elsa, Otto}[in w, g(2) is a passport picture of x]
(15) λw . the hearer has seen g(2) in w
4The existential presupposition generated by a question is an implicit part of the analyses of wh-island effects
which rely on Dayal’s (1996) principle of the existence of a maximally true answer, such as [9], [24] and references
therein. The requirement that there exist a maximally true answer entails that there must exist a true answer,
which is the same as the existential presupposition in the sense of [1].
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How does the “existential” presupposition relate to the felicity conditions on the use of the
question in (2)? I will make use of Stalnaker’s (1974) notion of a “context set” as a set of
possible worlds c where all the propositions believed to be true by conversation participants,
and which form the Common Ground, are true. According to [28, 4], who develops the insight
of [27] about “bridging” semantic well-formedness and pragmatic felicity, it is an “irreducible
property of natural language” that an utterance is felicitous only in case the function it denotes
is defined in all the context set worlds. I assume that Stalnaker’s bridging principle is extendable
onto cases of “floating” presuppositions such as the one proposed by [1]. In our specific case,
this means that in order for the question in (2) to be asked felicitously, (14) and (15) have to be
true in all the worlds in the context set. What makes such a question ungrammatical, I argue,
is a conflict between the felicity conditions and some cooperativeness principle such as a version
of the Gricean informativeness maxim of the kind “don’t ask a question when no answer will
provide you with new information”. This conflict is going to arise in any Common Ground. I
will refer to the relevant cooperativeness principle as Question information-seeking potential.
I propose that a question has a zero information-seeking potential when no proposition in its
denotation can change the inquirer’s state of knowledge in any Common Ground.
We find a similar effect in simple declaratives: an utterance whose asserted content is part
of what is required to be part of the Common Ground for the utterance to be felicitous sounds
odd, as observed by [2]. On this approach we can explain the infelicity of (16) as arising from
the presupposition (that there exist two students, triggered by both) entailing the assertion of
existence.
(16) *There are both students.
3.2 The presuppositions of the answers
A possible objection to the claim that a question which gives rise to answers with identical
asserted content entailed by the Common Ground has zero information-seeking potential is
that the informational import of an answer might be in its presuppositional part. It is well
known that conversation participants are able to accommodate presuppositions (at least since
[27], [15]). In the case at hand one could say that updating of the Common Ground can
be achieved not by virtue of adding the asserted content of an answer as such, but a) either
by virtue of accommodating the existential presupposition of the question or b) by virtue of
accommodating the presuppositional content of the answers.
We can rule out the first option right away since what it means is that it is not part of
the Common Ground that there is a true answer to the question. But, according to [1], an
expression associated with a set of alternatives automatically makes it part of the Common
Ground that one of the alternatives is true. That is, it does not depend on the state of
knowledge of a particular inquirer and/or addressee. The second option, namely, updating the
Common Ground with answers’ presupposition, requires some more discussion. From looking
at (17), we can conclude that presuppositions of all answers have to be entailed by the Common
Ground in order for a question to be felicitous: it has to be part of the Common Ground that
all individuals in the relevant domain actually have a hat (by virtue of the definedness condition
on the function denoted by an eNP with a Saxon genitive that there exists a unique individual
with the nominal property which belongs to the possessor).
(17) Among Peter, Bill, and Sam, whose hat do you like best?
Possible answers to (17) are I like Peter’s hat, I like Bill’s hat, and I like Sam’s hat. These
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answers presuppose that Peter has a hat, Bill has a hat, and Sam has a hat, respectively. Since
it is strange to ask this question with regard to Peter, Bill, and Sam if only the former two
have a hat, while Sam does not, we can conclude that possible answers’ presuppositions project
universally onto the level of question semantics. What is crucial for the current discussion is
that the accommodation can happen only on the side of the person to whom the question is
addressed, as the infelicity of the following exchange shows where A accommodates that Peter
has a hat.
(18) A: Among Peter, Bill, and Sam, whose hat do you like best? B: Peter’s. A: #Oh, I
didn’t know Peter had a hat.
Getting back to wh-subextraction out of strong-eNP, for the question in (13) to be felicitous
in a given Common Ground, the following propositions have to hold: that g(2) is a passport
picture of Hans, that g(2) is a passport picture of Elsa, and that g(2) is a passport picture of
Otto.5 While the addressee can still be ignorant the presuppositional content and simply ready
to accommodate it, the inquirer cannot be ignorant about a presupposition that he introduces.6
This rules out the possibility that answers in (13) can be informative for the inquirer by virtue
of their presuppositional content. This means that a felicitously uttered question of this kind
cannot update the inquirer’s state of knowledge in any Common Ground. This makes (2)
different from rhetorical and biased questions (e.g. Did Peter (even) lift a finger to help you?),
which are uninformative only with respect to some Common Grounds ([3], [11]).
We also encounter questions with truly zero information-seeking potential in the case of
wh-extraction out of complements of factive verbs which contain the so called “one-time-only”
predicates, as discussed in [21].
(19) #Who does Max know that Alice got married to on June 1st?
If we assume that it is presupposed that at least one answer in the answer-set is true, in the
set corresponding to the denotation of (19) there is only one true answer since there is only
one assertable answer (e.g. Max knows that Alice got married to John on June 1st which pre-
supposes Alice got marred to John on June 1st), as the presuppositions of the possible answers
are mutually exclusive. That is, for (19) to be uttered felicitously, a Common Ground has to
entail all the contents of its only assertable answer. [21] dubs such context-independent prag-
matic infelicity non-contingent, as opposed to contingent infelicity which obtains only in specific
contexts. Wh-subextraction out of strong-eNPs is another case of non-contingent infelicity.
3.3 Wh-subextraction out of weak-eNP
Now that the proposal for why it is bad with strong-eNP has been fully fleshed out, let us take
a look at the grammatical wh-subextraction out of weak-eNPs in (1). Given (5), the denotation
of the TP, combined with the semantics of the wh-word, gives the following denotation for the
5Note that in this particular case there is an additional potential source of infelicity, namely that the universal
projection of answers’ presuppositions entails that g(2) is a passport picture of all three, which is pragmatically
implausible. However, this cannot be the main source of infelicity as wh-subextraction is still ungrammatical if
passport picture is replaced with picture or with a different noun altogether.
6Moreover, as [26, 319] note, “attempts to answer questions using presuppositions ... are typically infelici-
tous”.
(i) Q: What’s the weather like? A: #Bob realizes/doesn’t realize that it’s raining
Even though technically Bob realizes that it’s raining is not an answer in Hamblin/Karttunen’s sense and the
inquirer is not responsible for introducing the presupposition that it’s raining, the addressee is still not supposed
to convey novel information by making the inquirer accommodate a presupposition.
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question with the weak article.
(20) [[(1)]] = {[λw′ : in w′, there exists a unique passport picture of x . the hearer has seen
the unique passport picture of x in w′]: x∈{Hans, Elsa, Otto}}
Obviously, these answers assert different things. The requirement that one of the alternatives
be true, combined with universal projection of the presuppositions of the answers, amounts in
this case to the truth of the following proposition.
(21) λw . ∀x∈{Hans, Elsa, Otto}[there exists a unique passport picture of x in w] &
∃x∈{Hans, Elsa, Otto}[the hearer has seen the unique passport picture of x in in
w]
This proposition, if entailed by the Common Ground, does not make an answer such as I have
seen the passport picture of Hans uninformative.
This analysis makes a prediction that if under some conditions strong/demonstrative-eNPs
were to behave like weak/the-eNPs in that their denotation would be covarying with a quantifier-
bound variable, wh-subextraction should be repaired. Such conditions happen to exist, one of
them being modification of the head noun by a restrictive relative clause, [17], and the prediction
is borne out, as (22) shows, where wh-subextraction out of a strong-eNP is possible.
(22) Vo
of
wem1
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detw
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t
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a
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made
hot]]
has
brocht?
brought
‘Who did Hans bring that picture of that he made himself?’
4 Conclusions
I proposed that the key to the pathology of wh-subextraction out of strong-eNPs is the seman-
tics of the strong article in the version of [25], which anchors the denotation of the eNP-of-
extraction to a given individual and thus precludes the assertive content of answer-propositions
from covarying with the wh-bound variable. From the cross-linguistic perspective, then, the
impossibility of wh-subextraction out of certain eNPs can serve as a diagnostic for the semantic
nature of the article involved. Namely, the impossibility of wh-subextraction out of a given eNP
indicates its direct referentiality. According to my preliminary investigation, eNPs headed by
demonstratives are islands for wh-subextraction in English, Italian, Spanish, Russian, French,
and Komi. One immediately relevant research area in this respect are the so called referential
uses of indefinites, discussed in [8]. Another highly relevant testing ground for the proposal are
cases of subextraction out of eNPs in non-questions, such as topicalization and relativization-
related movements.
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